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We appear to be unaware of large changes in our visual
scene if our attention is temporarily diverted. This
suggests that the rich, complete visual scene that we
appear to have may be just an illusion.
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As I gaze around my office, looking for inspiration as to
how to start this article, I have the impression of a
complete and rich scene, and that I am aware of each of
the many items that clutter my room. If someone were to
take my coffee cup(s) to wash, or rearrange the pile of ‘to
be read’ reprints, whilst I blinked or temporarily glanced
elsewhere, I would surely notice such a change. But recent
experiments suggest that this apparent perceptual
richness is all an illusion — large, dramatic alterations of a
visual scene can occur without our awareness if the
mechanism by which attention is normally drawn to the
changes is somehow compromised.
A particularly vivid example of this general phenomenon
has recently been reported by O’Regan et al. [1]. They
presented people with a ‘realistic’ scene, such as the
picture of my desk in Figure 1, followed immediately by
the same scene with some aspect of it altered (Figure 1b).
The observer has to ‘spot the difference’ — just as in the
comic-book games we enjoyed as children. With just this
simple change, the observers had no problem and
detected the change immediately. But this was not the
case when the change was accompanied by ‘mud-
splashes’ — patches of grey that were well away from the
site of the change between the two versions of the picture,
and that the subjects knew were irrelevant and should be
ignored (as in Figure 1c, with pink mudsplashes). These
mudsplashes had a devastating effect on performance —
on many occasions, the observer would fail to detect the
picture change after 40 seconds (over eight alternations
between the scenes). But once spotted, such changes
seem impossible not to see, even with the mudsplashes.
So why do the mudsplashes stop the change being
detected in the first place? 
The results suggest that we do not have a complete
internal representation of the visual scene we are looking
at, as large changes may go unnoticed. What we may have
is an extremely sparse representation, with only the infor-
mation from the focus of attention available to us.
Considering again the example of Figure 1, we seem to
solve this task by attending to the information about one
part of the scene — let us say the coffee mug — and then
going to the other picture to see if this is the same. This
deliberate, wilful moving of attention from location to
location is termed ‘endogenous attention’, and once it has
arrived at the appropriate location it allows us to see the
scene changes even in the presence of mudsplashes.
There is, however, another way in which our attention can
be shifted to an area of interest — by exogenous or
stimulus-driven cues. For example, the sudden appear-
ance of a student in my doorway, or the clatter of falling
books, may automatically bring my attention to bear at the
location of this kerfuffle. It appears that visual transients
— such as a change in luminance in some part of the scene
Figure 1
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(a) A picture of my desk. (b) A picture of my desk that has been tampered with. (c) As (b), but with six pink mudsplashes. (d) As (a), but with a
section of the image covered by a yellow block.
— are particularly good at attracting attention, and the
shifting of the pen and the white-out (how many spotted
that!) cause such transients and hence attracts my
attention. But the mudsplashes also cause transients and
compete for attention; as they are many and large, the
mudsplashes may often win in the battle to attract atten-
tion, so that attention does not alight on the crucial change
which is consequently missed.
Such a theory would suggest that other ways of destroying
this exogenous attention shift would produce similar
‘change blindness’. It is well documented that change
detectors — the neurons that signal visual motion —
operate over a small time interval of no more than one
tenth of a second [2,3]. Hence, the introduction of a small
blank interval between the frames should have the same
effect as the mudsplashes, and this has indeed been found
to be the case [4]. Perhaps, then, other brief ‘blanks’
would also produce blindness to such image changes. One
such blank occurs whenever we blink our eyes, and so if
we were to produce our image changes at the very
moment people blink they should be extremely poor at
spotting such changes (they should only notice the change
if they happened to be attending to that bit of the image
just before the blink). Again, the results of such
experiments confirm this idea [5]. Finally, another blank
in our perception occurs approximately 170,000 times a
day as our eyes flick from position to position — the so-
called saccadic eye movements — while we examine the
visual world. Again, large changes in scenes appear to go
unnoticed if they are synchronised to the saccadic shifts of
the eye [6,7]. 
This rich complete world I claim to see might thus be an
illusion created by a series of successive samples of the
image, and really I know little other than the point at
which my attention happens to be. Again, O’Regan et al.
[1] have illustrated the point persuasively. They simply
had observers view a scene, and then placed a mudsplash
over some part and asked the observer what is now under
the mudsplash. In line with the notion that our knowledge
of a visual scene at any moment is actually very limited,
the observers were very poor at identifying the now
hidden object. Again, try this for yourself. Closely observe
Figure 1a and then rapidly shift gaze to Figure 1d — what
was under the yellow block?
If we are indeed unable to report these seemingly obvious
stimulus features, where is the ‘problem’ occurring? Do
we simply not encode anything of the non-attended
features so that, without changes to guide us, we have but
a small aperture of attention through which to peer? Do
we carry out a rough analysis to extract some basic charac-
teristics, but not details, of a visual scene? Or do we fully
analyse all aspects of the scene but only place a small
portion into our realm of consciousness? The first of these
three possibilities seems unlikely. As I hunt for my keys
upon my desk or as you hunted for the difference between
the pictures of Figure 1, our eyes move from object to
object rather than to random positions — clearly then we
must have some representation of these things before our
attention alights upon them [8]. 
Deciding between the second and third possibilities may
be less straightforward. There is already evidence that
quite complex information may be extracted from the
‘unseen’ parts of the image [9], and that high level aspects
of the target help determine whether it is seen. When we
are at a noisy party, for instance, we normally ‘hear’ little
of what is said by people other than the speaker to whom
we are currently attending. But if our name is mentioned
in one of these other conversations, this information seems
to be readily detected. Similarly, Mack and Rock [10]
have shown that our own name presented visually tends to
break our change blindness far better than someone else’s.
Such high level influences do not, however, rule out lower
level ones. My internal visual world may be considerably
more impoverished than it appears to be. But why should
I go to the trouble of constructing a complex detailed
visual scene inside my head? There is, after all, a perfectly
good one right in from of my eyes [11]!
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